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INTRODUCTION
Renewable energy sources such as biomass, wind and solar power are relatively 
new means of generating electricity. Until recently, electricity was typically domi-
nated by fossil fuels (coal, gas and oil), large-scale hydro and nuclear power in 
centralised systems of very large, GW-scale generation units. In contrast, new 
renewable power is typically built in smaller units and can attract investors outside 
the traditional circle of utilities and industrial self-generators.1 Whilst renewables 
rely heavily on public funding to support their further development and deployment, 
they are becoming more competitive with traditional electricity generation tech-
nologies and can seriously affect their profitability, even their survival.2 Together 
these factors mean that incumbent utilities (i.e. major companies that dominate 
conventional electricity production) have been forced to respond to something we 
refer to as the ‘renewable challenge’.
Since the 1990s, when many European electricity markets were ‘liberalised’, there 
has been a trend towards further market concentration. This means that some 
incumbents are now among the most highly capitalised companies in the world.3 
Prior to liberalisation, many European utilities had close links to the state via public 
ownership and via sub-national or national monopolies. Utilities were seen as a key 
1  Large-scale, centralised concepts such as offshore wind or DESERTEC (solar power) do exist, but most renewable installa-
tions are on a smaller scale.
2  Rogol, M. (2011) Explosive Growth. Austin, TX, USA: Live Oak Book Company (see Chapter 2).
3  Thomas, S. (2003) The seven brothers. Energy Policy 31(5):393-403.S
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infrastructure industry and offered career opportunities to former political leaders 
and bureaucrats. Hence one would expect that utilities could face the renewable 
challenge from a position of strength. Surprisingly this has not always been the 
case. Incumbents in Germany and Sweden – the two countries discussed here – 
demonstrate a wide range of responses to the renewables challenge.
In this chapter we analyse utilities’ responses to the renewable challenge using the 
reactive-defensive-accommodative-proactive scale as popularised by research on 
Corporate Social Responsibility.4 By responses, we refer primarily to incumbents’ 
‘nonmarket’ strategies for dealing with renewables. Generally speaking, nonmarket 
strategies are typically those that seek to influence “the social, political, and legal 
arrangements that structure interactions outside of, although in conjunction with, 
markets and private agreements”.5 Since public policy is a major determinant 
of market opportunities related to renewable energy, we focus particularly on 
incumbents’ attempts to influence renewable energy policies. However, in some 
instances we describe how incumbents have sought to influence renewables 
through court cases (legal arrangements) and the media (social arrangements). 
We trace incumbents’ nonmarket strategies in Germany and Sweden through time 
to show that responses to the renewable challenge vary according to different 
social and political contexts. 
PATTERNS OF RESPONSES
We apply the reactive-defensive-accommodative-proactive (RDAP) scale to exam-
ine how incumbent utilities respond to renewable energy developments. The scale 
is commonly used to examine companies’ social responsibility (see Figure 13.1), 
and is a means of analysing corporate behaviour. Here we characterise utilities that 
are supportive of renewable energy developments as proactive. In contrast, utilities 
that oppose renewable energy developments are reactive, in that they attempt to 
block or limit renewable energy policies, for instance, via non-market strategies. 
Reaction
Fight all the way
OPPOSITION SUPPORT
Do only what is required Be progressive Lead the industry
Defense Accomodation Proaction
Figure 13.1 The RDAP scale for corporate social responsibility. Adapted from Carroll (1979).
In the proactive mode, one would expect incumbents to actively participate in 
policymaking for new renewable technologies. Incumbents can do this by sup-
porting policy developments and by providing key inputs to policy design. They 
can also encourage renewable technologies and new business models. As part 
of a proactive approach, incumbents can form alliances with powerful actors such 
as political parties, energy intensive industries, and labour unions; foster direct 
contacts to ministries and MPs; and seek to positively influence public opinion via 
media and other channels. 
4  Carroll, A.B. (1979) A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance. The Academy of Management 
Review, 4(4):497-505
5  Baron, D.P. (2003) Business and its environment. Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA: Prentice Hall.
140
We would expect incumbents to be accommodative if they are satisfied with exist-
ing public policies, or otherwise if attempts at proactive influence did not achieve 
their primary goals. Accommodative incumbents may also see new renewables 
as an opportunity for their own business and thus accept rather than oppose the 
adoption of renewables among actors outside the utility sector.
In the defensive mode, incumbents typically aim to protect their own turf by making 
things difficult for challengers. For example, incumbents may demand complicated 
and unfavourable contracts from generators; delay the connection of renewable 
generation facilities via bureaucratic or ‘invented’ technical problems; make grid 
access difficult or very expensive; delay payments to generators or question their 
own obligations; charge excessive balancing costs; withhold merit order savings 
by new renewables from consumers; and so on. 
Incumbents are likely to resort to the reactive mode if they did not achieve their 
regulatory policy goals, or if they feel sufficiently threatened by new market 
entrants. In such situations incumbents may take strong, hostile action by ques-
tioning the legal basis of the policy to which they are averse; by pressuring govern-
ments to modify legislation or decrees in order to slow down renewables deploy-
ment or to make it less profitable; by discrediting new renewables as backwards, 
messing up the landscape, or overly expensive; or by discrediting the particular 
regulation as a risk to industrial competitiveness and to the market economy.
The choice of these modes partly depends on how individual incumbents respond 
to the opportunity structure (political, technical, economic, natural resources, pub-
lic acceptance etc.) they are confronted with. Incumbents’ choices will be guided 
by their profit orientation, but also by different views of the profit potential of new 
renewables given the business model of the incumbent concerned. 
INCUMBENTS’ RESPONSES TO THE RENEWABLE CHALLENGE IN 
SWEDEN
In Sweden, three multinational energy companies produce around 90% of the 
country’s electricity (Vattenfall, E.On and Fortum). Whilst these companies cur-
rently dominate the electricity market, municipal energy companies have existed in 
most Swedish towns and cities for a long time. These smaller utilities are primarily 
responsible for the provision of district heating, but around 35 municipal compa-
nies also produce electricity. Hundreds of landowners also produce electricity 
in Sweden, though on a much smaller scale. Hence the term ‘incumbent utilities’ 
refers to the three main electricity producers together with municipal energy 
companies that produce both electricity and district heating.
Sweden has a long tradition of hydroelectric power, owing to the fact that the 
country has a huge resource endowment in the form of large rivers and lakes. 
The first hydropower plant was built in 1906 and nearly half of the electricity 
produced in Sweden today comes from hydropower. However, the current debate 
on renewable electricity has roots in the 1970s, when the oil crises brought about 
a major reorientation of Swedish energy policy. In order to reduce dependency on 
imported oil, the government financed research in renewable technologies and 
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energy saving programmes6 and stepped up the deployment of nuclear power. The 
major utilities were accommodative of these measures, despite the fact that energy 
savings could potentially reduce revenues. One reason for this is that reducing 
oil dependency could potentially strengthen major utilities given that municipal 
companies were heavily reliant on oil. The other reason is that the most significant 
response to the oil crises was the construction of 12 Swedish nuclear power 
plants from 1972-1985 – a move that was supported by the major utilities. Despite 
the fact that renewables offered a potential alternative to oil, Sweden experienced 
little growth in renewable capacity in the 1970s (see Figure 13.2).
TWh / year
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Figure 13.2 Swedish electricity generation 1971-2012. Sources: Data for 1960-2011 from IEA (2014), 2012 
adapted from the Swedish Energy Agency (2014).
Alongside its expansion, nuclear power became a politicised issue, and in 1980 
it was decided via a national referendum that nuclear power plants should be 
phased out in Sweden by the end of their operational lives (i.e. 2010). This gave a 
renewed impetus to the possibility of growth in renewables. Other environmental 
issues (e.g. acid rain, the ozone problem, climate change) climbed the Swedish 
political agenda towards the end of the 1980s. Hence in 1991, the government 
introduced a new long-term energy policy that sought to reaffirm the nuclear 
phase-out; protect unexploited rivers; and tackle climate change.7 As part of these 
changes, the Swedish government sought a unilateral approach on climate change 
via a carbon tax. In addition to the CO2 tax, the 1991 energy bill established a new 
6  Nilsson, L.J. et al. (2004) Seeing the Wood for the Trees: 25 years of Renewable Energy Policy in Sweden. Energy for Sus-
tainable Development, 8(1):67-81; Åstrand, K. and Neij, L. (2006) An Assessment of Governmental Wind Power Programmes in 
Sweden in Sweden Power Programme. Energy Policy, 34(3):277–296.
7  Nohrstedt, D. (2008) The Politics of Crisis Policymaking: Chernobyl and Swedish Nuclear Energy Policy. The Policy Studies 
Journal, 36(2):257-278.
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energy efficiency programme alongside further investments in renewable energy 
technology.8 The CO2 tax did not favour wind power, however, and piecemeal sub-
sidisation policies made investments risky.9 Major utilities were defensive towards 
the CO2 tax (by opposing it, together with export-oriented energy intensive 
industries) but in the end had to settle for tax exemptions. Moreover, utilities were 
opposed to Sweden’s unilateral approach to climate change and were reactive 
towards a government attempt to double taxation levels. As part of their reactive 
strategy, incumbents questioned the validity of climate science and emphasised 
risks to Swedish industrial competitiveness.
In the early 1990s, Sweden suffered a major economic crisis that resulted in 
recession. The Swedish government responded by initiating a range of neoliberal 
market reforms and became a member of the EC as part of a new Swedish growth 
strategy.10 The Swedish energy industry linked deregulation to European proposals 
to harmonise European energy markets. The latter were supported by large utilities 
such as Vattenfall, given the possibility of expanding into the German electricity 
market. However, smaller utilities raised concerns that power companies which 
are forced to compete on price are likely to invest in the cheapest energy sources, 
with negative effects for the environment, resource use and energy security. At this 
point the dominant view within the energy industry was that there was a need for 
long-term, coherent and politically stable policy instruments that would ensure that 
renewables such as wind turbines could compete with fossil fuels. In other words, 
incumbents were, together with other electricity producers, proactive as regards 
the introduction of renewable energy policies. 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the Swedish government took up an initiative from 
the European Commission and proposed that an electricity certificate scheme 
(ECS) replace subsidies for renewables. At this stage incumbents restated their 
support for renewables and nicknamed the ECS the ‘green certificate system’. 
In the consultation phase that preceded the establishment of the ECS, only one 
stakeholder group opposed the scheme as part of a reactive strategy. The Swed-
ish association of small energy producers (SERO) argued instead for a feed-in 
tariff, a stance they maintained deep into the next decade. SERO was concerned 
that small electricity producers would not be able to compete with large utilities in 
the context of a quota-certificate system, due to their lack of financial capital. 
Around 2006, climate change became a salient energy policy issue. During this 
period, the Swedish government sought to re-establish its unilateral approach to 
tackling climate change, embodied in ambitious emission reduction targets and 
further growth in renewables.11 The EU emission-trading scheme was implemented 
in Sweden as part of this approach, which was met with opposition from large 
utilities and energy intensive industry. Together these industries pursued a defen-
sive strategy and argued that climate and energy policies should create a level 
8  Nilsson, L.J. et al. (2004) Seeing the Wood for the Trees: 25 years of Renewable Energy Policy in Sweden. Energy for Sus-
tainable Development, 8(1):67-81; Åstrand, K. and Neij, L. (2006) An Assessment of Governmental Wind Power Programmes in 
Sweden in Sweden Power Programme. Energy Policy, 34(3):277–296.
9  Åstrand and Neij (2006); Wang, Y. (2006) Renewable Electricity in Sweden: An Analysis of Policy and Regulations. Energy 
Policy, 34(10):1209–1220.
10  Nordhaus, W.D. (1997) The Swedish Nuclear Dilemma. Washington, DC, USA: Resources for the Future.
11  Sarasini, S. (2009) Constituting Leadership via Policy: Sweden as a Pioneer of Climate Change Mitigation. Mitigation and 
Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 14(7):635-653.
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playing field for industries exposed to international competition. The government 
responded by providing further exemptions, this time by relaxing allocation criteria 
for emission permits to energy intensive industries. 
The three multinational energy companies that operate in Sweden have on other 
occasions sought to hamper the government’s unilateral approach. Particularly 
Vattenfall, whose portfolio includes coal-fired power in Germany and Poland, 
forced Svensk Energi (the main industry association for the Swedish energy 
industry) to be more liberal in their stance towards ETS permit allocations. Vat-
tenfall also launched a lobby coalition called ‘3C’ prior to the Copenhagen climate 
summit that advocated a global climate treaty with emission trading as the main 
instrument. In doing so, Vattenfall sought to: 1) ensure a level playing field between 
electricity producers and 2) allay fears that European energy intensive manufactur-
ers may lose out to competition from their Asian or North American counterparts 
with access to cheaper energy. Whilst the 3C initiative is part of a proactive 
climate policy strategy, Vattenfall wanted to secure its international customer base 
(i.e. industrial customers in Sweden and other European countries) in light of the 
EU’s unilateral approach to climate mitigation.
In spite of industry opposition to Sweden’s unilateral approach, the electricity 
industry has for the most part supported the two main policy instruments that cur-
rently promote investments in renewable electricity production. The main reason 
for this is that the combination of the EU ETS and the Swedish ECS has resulted 
in windfall profits for most energy companies, who are able to take advantage of 
the fact that around 90% of Swedish electricity is produced from nuclear and 
hydropower. Increased revenues are mainly the result of price-setting mechanisms 
in the context of Nordpool (the Nordic electricity market). Particularly the ETS 
allows Swedish electricity producers to charge the additional costs of marginal 
fossil fuel production onto consumers, which means that electricity from hydro-
power (which is typically much cheaper than coal-fired power) is sold at a higher 
rate than if the ETS did not exist. 
One of the main impacts of the ECS has been growth in wind power, from 0.9 
TWh in 2004 to 7 TWh in 2012. Whilst this statistic could in theory placate 
renewable suppliers, small electricity producers have continued to advocate the 
introduction of a feed-in tariff, albeit as part of a modified political strategy. Having 
realised that the certificate scheme is here to stay, SERO have instead begun to 
argue proactively for a parallel FIT system that complements the ECS. Their main 
argument is that the ECS precludes smaller electricity producers, who struggle to 
raise the capital required to invest in wind power – especially since the financial 
crisis. However SERO is still defensive as regards the ECS, having opposed its 
recent expansion to include Norway. SERO fears that Norway will attract more 
renewable investments than Sweden given higher potentials for wind power. In 
doing so, SERO sought the support of the Swedish Wind Power Association and 
has also established ties with the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) 
and the European Renewable Energy Federation (EREF).12 One reason for this is 
12  Sarasini, S (2013) Institutional work and climate change: Corporate political action in the Swedish electricity industry. Energy 
Policy, 56:480-489. 
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that smaller energy producers feel ostracised from Swedish policy-making, which 
is typically performed in a corporatist fashion and led by the agencies of the state 
in a manner that benefits established industrial actors.13
INCUMBENTS’ RESPONSES TO THE RENEWABLE CHALLENGE IN 
GERMANY
By comparison, the German incumbent response to the renewable challenge is 
far more antagonistic than its Swedish counterpart. There are four big utilities 
in Germany today (RWE, E.on, EnBW and Vattenfall), down from about a dozen 
before (incomplete) liberalisation in the late 1990s. They generate electricity 
mostly on the basis of soft and hard coal, nuclear and gas (in this order) and have 
a very small share in renewables generation (Figure 13.3). In the energy crisis of 
the 1970s, the government favoured expanding nuclear and coal generation, also 
adding modest R&D for renewables. Nuclear and coal however soon became the 
target of a powerful movement for Energiewende (energy transformation towards 
renewables and efficiency). This social movement held strong anti-nuclear views 
(majoritarian after Chernobyl 1986) and also opposed coal power – first for its 
SO2 emissions, later mostly for CO2.
Solar & WindBiomass & WasteNuclearHydroOilCoal & Peat Natural Gas
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Figure 13.3 German electricity generation 1960-2013. Sources: Data for 1960-2011 from IEA (2014), 2012-2013 
adapted from AGEB (2014).
This movement was taken up by parliament (against the preferences of the 
government and the incumbents) which in 1990 passed a law on a feed-in tariff 
to support market creation for non-utility, decentralised renewables installations. 
Ten years later, a Social Democratic-Green government adopted the Renewable 
Energy Act (EEG – Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz) as well as a nuclear phase-out 
13  Uba, K. (2010) Who Formulates Renewable-Energy Policy? A Swedish Example. Energy Policy, 38(11):6674–6683.
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law. The former provided for the transition to renewable electricity (but without a 
time horizon yet) by granting guaranteed twenty-year, highly differentiated tariffs 
and priority access to renewables. The scope of this law was further expanded in 
2004 and 2008 and resulted in the steep growth of wind, biomass and PV power 
through 2012. In 2013, PV growth was more than halved.
From the beginning, the incumbents had been sceptical or outright hostile 
towards renewables. Small installations did not fit their centralised paradigm or 
their business culture. In the absence of sympathy from the government (except 
for some measures in favour of coal), they resorted to both defensive and reac-
tive approaches. They challenged feed-in tariffs in various court venues; tried to 
replace them with a quota-cum-certificates system;14 harassed generators; and 
tried to turn public opinion against wind and solar. For a long time though these 
efforts were unsuccessful; even the Conservatives came to support EEG after the 
2005 election. 
Things changed only in 2009 with a new Conservative-Liberal coalition, which 
remained in place until 2013. Back in 2000, these two parties had opposed the 
nuclear phase-out.15 Now they decided to postpone it by about a decade so that 
cheap nuclear power could form a bridge to the age when renewables would be 
affordable and market competitive. This postponement was barely adopted when 
the Fukushima accident took place, leading to a reversal of the government posi-
tion. Now it proposed to accelerate Energiewende, while at the same time making 
it affordable by supposedly subjecting it to market discipline. 
At this time the incumbents were urging a slowdown of renewables deployment. 
This deployment had become quite rapid and cut into their markets and their 
profits, partly as an effect of the merit order system (based on marginal costs of 
production) prioritising renewable electricity (see also Chapter 11 and 15). This 
eliminated the more expensive forms of fossil generation (i.e. oil, gas and some 
hard coal plants) and meant steadily falling prices on the electricity exchange from 
2008 onwards. PV had the most devastating impact on incumbents’ profits since 
it reduced demand for conventional generation at peak hours and peak prices. 
It grew by 22.5 GWp in just three years, 2010-2012, to reach about 35 GWp 
in 2013. Within a few years, profits and stock values of the incumbent utilities 
plummeted;16 the outlook for the future seemed dim as the Renewable Energy 
Act of 2000 limited conventional generation to providing the ‘residual load’ that 
renewables could not yet meet. 
The Conservative-Liberal government was willing to accommodate incumbents’ 
demand for slowing down renewables, claiming that the latter’s cost to consumers 
had become unacceptable while refusing to deal with the underlying problem of 
the EEG surcharge (see Chapter 15). Beginning in 2010, the government came 
14  Compare the development of the ECS in Sweden. However, German supporters of quotas looked at the UK, not at Sweden. 
Quota systems are advantageous to incumbents as they tend to keep non-incumbents away, produce sizeable windfall profits and 
limit deployment overall. See Lauber, V. (2011) The European Experience with Renewable Energy Support Schemes and Their 
Adoption: Potential Lessons for Other Countries. Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review, 2(2):121-133.
15  Even the incumbents were not eager for new nuclear build given its controversial nature in Germany.
16  European utilities: How to lose half a trillion euros. Europe’s electricity providers face an existential threat (2013) The Econo-
mist, Oct. 13.
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up with a variety of initiatives to impose limits to deployment of renewables which 
it is true had exceeded expectations,17 first by extending the lifetime of nuclear; 
in 2012-13 it attempted to introduce caps on deployment or on support. The 
more radical attempts were stopped by opposition from the regions. In late 2013 
however, a similar approach was incorporated into the coalition agreement for the 
new Conservative-Social Democratic government.18 First legislative drafts propose 
to contain growth of renewable electricity by a corridor that replaced former 
minimum targets that were regularly overshot, and to abolish feed-in tariffs within a 
few years in favour of market premiums set via bidding systems.
Incumbents also sought modifications of the electricity market framework to 
protect conventional generation from the advance of renewables, arguing that the 
declining profits of coal generation after 2008 endangered the security of electric-
ity supply as it would inevitably lead to shutting down coal plants needed to guar-
antee against shortfalls of intermittent renewables. Yet a new wave of coal plants is 
coming online – one of the biggest expansions since the days of post-World War 
II reconstruction.19 Despite this abundant supply of conventional generation the 
incumbents now demanded capacity payments to improve the economics of fossil 
standby plants. This solution was resisted by the Conservative-Liberal government 
but met with more sympathy from the Conservative-Social Democratic government 
that took office in 2013. In that year, the incumbents also proposed a new support 
system for renewables based on market premiums (to replace the EEG’s feed-in 
tariffs) which would remove incentives to operate wind and solar plants during 
periods of oversupply resulting from the inflexibility of conventional plants (nuclear, 
soft coal, to some extent hard coal – see also Chapter 11).20 First legislative initia-
tives in early 2014 incorporated those proposals.
Recently, incumbents have been moving hesitatingly into the renewables business 
themselves. For a long time they had fostered the dream of gigawatt-scale wind 
and solar farms in North Africa to transmit electricity to Europe (DERSERTEC) as 
part of their future business activity. With cheaper solar panels and the investment 
insecurity that followed the Arab spring, this dream has suffered a severe setback. 
Offshore wind in the North and Baltic seas is a European alternative but slow in 
coming (see Chapter 15 and 16); German incumbents prefer to build offshore 
plants in more profitable settings abroad. But in 2008 and again in 2013, at least 
some of the incumbents have indicated that they see a future for themselves in 
renewable energy and accept the progressive decline of conventional generation, 
as recently stated by RWE’s chief executive.21 Even solar PV seems to be on the 
incumbent agenda now, both in terms of big solar farms and rooftops.22 But then 
the alternative – a radical shrinkage of incumbents’ German operations – does not 
seem unlikely either.23 
17  In its 2010 National Renewable Energy Action Plan to the EU (2010), Germany proposed a target for RES-E of 38.6%, slightly 
more than 10% higher than the 35% set in Energiekonzept 2010 and the 30% of EEG 2008. 
18  The Social Democratic Party contains a ‘coal fraction’ sympathetic to coal power which came to the fore recently.
19  International Energy Agency (IEA) (2013) Energy Policy of IEA Countries – Germany, 2013 Review. Paris, France: OECD/
IEA.
20  BDEW German Association of Energy and Water Industries (2013) Proposals for a fundamental reform of the German 
Renewable Energy Source Act. Position paper. Berlin, Germany: BDEW.
21  Terium, P. (2013) RWE-Chef Terium plant radikalen Strategieschwenk. Handelsblatt, Oct. 29 [accessed 2013-11-23]
22  International Energy Agency (IEA) (2013) Trends in Photovoltaic Applications. Paris, France: OECD/IEA.
23  Becker, P. (2011) Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Stromkonzerne. Bochum, Germany: Ponte Press Verlag GmbH.
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CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis shows that incumbents have responded very differently to the 
renewable challenge in Sweden and Germany. As noted previously, the German 
case is far more antagonistic than its Swedish counterpart. These differences can 
be attributed in part to natural resource endowments. Germany, for instance, is a 
domestic producer of soft coal; has fewer sources of hydropower and biomass 
than Sweden; and there is little storage for solar and wind power, which aggra-
vates the problem of intermittency. In contrast, Sweden has large potentials for 
wind power and biomass; a large proportion of Swedish electricity is produced 
from hydropower; and both biomass and hydro are largely regular or dispatch-
able. The composition of the electricity system in terms of installed technologies 
and fuels is thus also an important determinant of the incumbent response to 
renewables.
Another factor that differentiates the Swedish and German cases is the political, 
or energy policy-making system. We characterise the Swedish political system 
as a relatively closed corporatist system dominated by big industry, trade unions 
and the agencies of the state. In contrast the German system, despite also being 
largely corporatist, is more open and subject to influence from powerful social 
movements, which led to the introduction of a feed-in tariff and the subsequent 
deployment of renewable generation overwhelmingly by non-utility investors 
who despite lower rates of profitability are more committed to deployment than 
incumbents.
This difference in the political subsystem makes the German and Swedish cases 
in a sense mirror opposites in terms of regulation. In Sweden, incumbents have 
proactively influenced renewable energy policymaking, with the result that the 
existing quota system is financially beneficial for them. Feeling alienated, smaller 
electricity producers have pursued a reactive strategy, albeit with little success. 
In contrast, German incumbents were not able to impose their policy preferences, 
opposed the feed-in tariff throughout and largely missed the boat on deployment. 
Their reactive approach has included various nonmarket tactics that have sought 
at first to raise practical hurdles for private investors, and later to alter the politi-
cal, legal, social and market arrangements for renewables in order to inhibit rapid 
deployment. When deployment had acquired substantial momentum, they shifted 
their focus to slowing it down via unfriendly regulation. Only very late in the game 
did they consider moving into the sector on their own.
Taken together, our cases suggest that incumbents respond according to their 
perceived financial interests, and their responses to the renewable challenge vary 
according to how they think they can maintain their market positions, including 
their profit expectations. Of course, these views reflect the bounded rationality of 
very large, centralised and cumbersome organisations. On the whole, their profit 
orientation was too short-term to envision active participation in the early phase 
of renewables development, whose then small installations seemed anti-modern 
and were easily identified with anti-nuclear positions that were anathema to the 
utilities in those days. In addition the latter needed to protect existing generation at 
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times of slow growth of electricity consumption. In Sweden, the utilities used their 
good access to politics to secure a quota-and-certificate system which selected 
technologies that were profitable and easily integrated. In Germany, utility refusal 
of a strong demand from society meant that they were eventually bypassed in a 
way that proved quite disruptive. The current government now appears determined 
to come to the help at the cost of slowing down the energy transition.
